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Ashutosh Nayyar and Demosthenis Teneketzis
Abstract— We consider a sequential problem in decentralized
detection. Two observers can make repeated noisy observations
of a binary hypothesis on the state of the environment. At
any time, any of the two observers can stop and send a final
message to the other observer or it may continue to take more
measurements. After an observer has sent its final message,
it stops operating. The other observer is then faced with a
different stopping problem. At each time instant, it can decide
either to stop and declare a final decision on the hypothesis or
take another measurement. At each time, the system incurs an
operating cost depending on the number of observers that are
active at that time. A terminal cost that measures the accuracy
of the final decision is incurred at the end. We show that,
unlike in other sequential detection problems, stopping rules
characterized by two thresholds on an observer’s posterior
belief no longer guarantee optimality in this problem. Thus
the potential for signaling among observers alters the nature of
optimal policies. We obtain a new parametric characterization
of optimal policies for this problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized detection problems are motivated by appli-
cations in large scale decentralized systems such as sensor
networks, power systems and surveillance networks. In such
networks, sensors receive different information about the
environment but share a common objective, for example to
decide if a fault has occurred or not in a power system, or to
detect the presence of a target in a surveillance area. Sensors
may be allowed to communicate but they are constrained
to exchange only a limited amount of information because
of energy constraints, data storage and data processing con-
straints, communication constraints etc.
Decentralized detection problems may be static or se-
quential. In static problems, sensors make a fixed number
of observations about a hypothesis on the state of the
environment which is modeled as a random variable H .
Sensors may transmit a single message (a quantized version
of their observations) to a fusion center which makes a final
decision on H . Such problems have been extensively studied
since their initial formulation in [1] (See the surveys in [2],
[3] and references therein). In most such formulations, it has
been shown that person-by-person optimal decision rules (as
defined in [4]) for a binary hypothesis detection problem
are characterized by thresholds on the likelihood ratio (or
equivalently on the posterior belief on the hypothesis).
In sequential problems, the number of observations taken
by the sensors is not fixed a priori. In the centralized
sequential detection problems, as formulated in [5], a sensor
can sequentially make costly observations and, after each
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observation, can choose whether to stop and declare its
final decision on H or to take more observations. In the
decentralized analogue of the sequential detection problem,
two (or more) sensors locally decide when to stop taking
more measurements and then make a final decision on H .
Each sensor pays a penalty for delaying its final decision
and a terminal cost that depends on the final decisions of
all the sensors and the true value of H is incurred at the
end. A version of this problem (called the decentralized
Wald problem) was formulated in [6] and it was shown
that at each time instant, optimal policies for the sensors
are described by two thresholds. The computation of these
thresholds requires solution of two coupled sets of dynamic
programming equations. Similar results were obtained in a
continuous time setting in [7].
A key feature of the decentralized Wald problem is that
the individual sensors do not communicate their decisions to
each other. That is, the ith sensor is not aware of decisions
of other sensors. This implies that if policies of all other
sensors are fixed, the ith sensor is faced with a classical
sequential detection problem for which two-threshold poli-
cies are optimal. In the problem we consider in this paper,
each sensor observes the other sensor’s decisions. Hence, in
addition to its own measurements of H , the ith sensor can
use the decisions made by other sensors (whether they have
stopped or not and whether the final decision was 0 or 1)
to make its decisions. The final decision of the sensor that
stops in the end is taken as the final decision made by the
group of sensors. Thus, sensors can convey information to
each other through their decisions. The presence of signaling
among sensors implies that, even if all other sensors have
fixed their strategies, the problem for ith sensor is no
longer a classical sequential detection problem. We show
that, for this problem, the classical two-threshold policies
no longer guarantee optimality. We obtain an alternative
parametric characterization of the optimal policies of the
sensors. A related sequential detection problem with one-
way communication was presented in [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we formulate our problem with two observers. We present
the information states for the observers in Section III. A
counterexample that shows that classical two-thresholds are
not necessarily optimal is presented in Section IV. We
derive a parametric characterization of optimal policies in
Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
Notation: Throughout this paper, X1:t refers to the se-
quence X1, X2, .., Xt. Subscripts are used as time index
and the superscripts are used as the index of the sensor.
We use capital letters to denote random variable and the
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corresponding lower case letters for their realizations.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a binary hypothesis problem where the true
hypothesis is modeled as a random variable H taking values
0 or 1 with known prior probabilities.
P (H = 0) = p0; P (H = 1) = 1− p0
Consider two observers: observer 1 (O1) and observer 2
(O2). We assume that each observer can make noisy obser-
vations of the true hypothesis. Conditioned on the hypothesis
H , the following statements are assumed to be true:
1. The observation of the ith observer at time t, (Y it )
(taking values in the set Yi), either has a discrete distribution
(P it (.|H)) or admits a probability density function (f it (.|H)).
2. Observations of the ith observer at different time instants
are conditionally independent given H .
3. The observation sequences at the two observers are
conditionally independent given H .
Observer i (i = 1, 2) observes the measurement process
Observer 1 Observer 2
Y 1t Y
2
t
H = 0,1
U1τ1
U2τ2
Fig. 1. Decentralized Detection
Y it (t = 1, 2, ...). If no observer has stopped before time t,
then at time t, any observer can decide either to stop and
send a binary message 0 or 1 to the other observer or to
postpone its decision and get another measurement. After an
observer has sent its final message, it stops operating. The
other observer (the one which has not yet stopped) is then
faced with a different stopping problem. At each time instant,
it can decide either to stop and declare a final decision on
the hypothesis or take another measurement.
We denote by U it the decision of the i
th observer at time
t. U it belongs to the set {0, 1, b}, where b denotes a blank,
that is, no message or no final decision. At time t, the ith
observer makes its decision based on its observations till time
t and the messages (blanks or otherwise) exchanged between
the two observers till time t− 1. We have,
U it = γ
i
t(Y
i
1:t, U
1
1:t−1, U
2
1:t−1) (1)
where the collection of functions Γi := (γit , t = 1, 2, . . .)
constitute the policy of the ith observer. We define the
following stopping times:
τ1 := min{t : U1t 6= b}
τ2 := min{t : U2t 6= b}
After the time τ i, all future observations and decisions of the
ith observer are assumed to be in the empty set (∅), that is,
the observer stops taking measurements or making decisions.
We assume that the final decision on the hypothesis must be
made no later than a finite horizon T , hence we have that
τ1 ≤ T and τ2 ≤ T . We define, τmin := min{τ1, τ2},
τmax := max{τ1, τ2} and
L :=
{
1 if τ2 < τ1
2 if τ2 ≥ τ1
The system incurs a total cost given by:
J (Γ1,Γ2)
:= EΓ
1,Γ2{K(τmin − 1) + k(τmax − τmin)
+ J(ULτmax , H)} (2)
where K > k > 0 are constants and J(·, ·) is a non-
negative distortion function with J(0, 0) = J(1, 1) = 0.
(The superscript Γ1,Γ2 over the expectation denotes that
the expectation is with respect to a measure that depends
on the choice of the policies Γ1,Γ2.) The first term in the
objective represents the operating costs when both observers
are active, the second term represents the operating cost of
only one observer. The operating costs incorporate the cost of
taking a new measurement, the energy cost of staying on for
another time step and/or a penalty for delaying the decision.
The last term in the objective represents the accuracy of the
final decision. Note that only the decision of the observer
that stops later is considered as the final decision. In case
of simultaneous decisions, only observer 2’s decision is
considered as the final decision. We can now formulate the
optimization problem as follows:
Problem P: Given the statistics of the binary hypothesis
and the observation processes, the cost parameters K, k, the
distortion function J(·, ·) and a time horizon T , the objective
is to select policies Γ1,Γ2 that minimize the total expected
cost in (2).
III. INFORMATION STATES
In this section, we identify information states for the
two observers. We start by fixing the policy of observer 1
to an arbitrary choice and finding a sufficient statistic for
observer 2. The nature of this sufficient statistic does not
depend on the arbitrary choice of observer 1’s policy. This
sufficient statistic is the information state for observer 2.
Consider a fixed policy Γ1 = (γ11 , γ
1
2 , ..., γ
1
T ) for O1. At
any time t, we define the following:
Definition 1: Given a fixed policy Γ1 of observer 1 and
functions γ21:t−1, we define observer 2’s belief on the hy-
pothesis given all its information at time t.
Π2t := P (H = 0|Y 21:t, U11:t−1, U21:t−1 = b1:t−1),
where b1:t−1 denotes a sequence of blank messages from
time 1 to t− 1. For t = 0, we have Π20 = p0.
We will show that the pair (Π2t ,1{τ1<t}) is the information
state for observer 2. We first describe the evolution of
(Π2t ,1{τ1<t}) in time in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: (i) 1{τ1<t+1} = 1{τ1<t} + 1{U1t 6=b}
(ii) With observer 1’s policy fixed to Γ1, Π2t evolves as
follows:
Π2t+1 =
{
ft+1(Π
2
t , Y
2
t+1) if 1{τ1<t} = 1
gt+1(Π
2
t , Y
2
t+1, U
1
t ) if 1{τ1<t} = 0
,
where ft+1 and gt+1 are deterministic functions.
Proof: See Appendix I.
The optimal policy for observer 2 (for the given choice of
Γ1) can be obtained by means of a dynamic program. We
now define the value functions of the dynamic program.
Definition 2: (i) For pi ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ {0, 1}, we
define
VT (pi, a) := min{E[J(0, H)|Π2T = pi],
E[J(1, H)|Π2T = pi]}
(ii) For pi ∈ [0, 1] and t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, we define
Vt(pi, 1)
= min{E[J(0, H)|Π2t = pi],E[J(1, H)|Π2t = pi],
k + E[Vt+1(Π
2
t+1, 1)|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=1]}
(iii) For pi ∈ [0, 1] and t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, we define
Vt(pi, 0) in equation (3) at the bottom of the page.
Theorem 1: With a fixed policy Γ1 of observer 1, there is
an optimal policy for observer 2 of the form:
U2t = γ
2
t (Π
2
t ,1{τ1<t})
for t = 1, 2, ..., T . Moreover, this optimal policy can be
obtained by the dynamic program described by the value
functions in Definition 2. Thus, at time t and for a given
pi and a, the optimal decision is 0 (or 1/b) if the first
(or second/third) term is the minimum in the definition of
Vt(pi, a).
Proof: See Appendix II.
The above arguments can be repeated by interchanging the
roles of observer 1 and observer 2 to conclude that for a fixed
policy Γ2 of observer 2, an optimal policy for observer 1 is
of the form:
U1t = γ
1
t (Π
1
t ,1{τ2<t})
where Π1t := P
Γ2(H = 0|Y 11:t, U21:t−1, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1).
Note, however, that the actual dynamic program for ob-
server 1 will differ from that of Theorem 1 because of the
asymmetry in the objective function of equation (2) when
both observers make simultaneous decisions to stop. While
the value functions VT and Vt(pi, 1) in the dynamic program
for observer 1 will the be same as in Definition 2, the value
function Vt(pi, 0) is given in equation (4) at the bottom of
the next page.
IV. A COUNTEREXAMPLE
In the sequential detection problem with a single observer
[5] , it is well known that an optimal policy is a function
of the observer’s posterior belief Πt and is described by two
thresholds at each time t. That is the decision at time t, Zt,
is given as:
Zt =
 1 if Πt ≤ αtb if αt < Πt < βt
0 if Πt ≥ βt
where b denotes a decision to continue taking measurement
and αt ≤ βt are real numbers in [0, 1]. A similar two-
threshold structure of optimal policies was also established
for the decentralized Wald problem in [6]. We will show
by means of a counterexample that such a structure is not
necessarily optimal in our problem.
Consider the following instance of Problem P. We have
equal prior on H , that is P (H = 0) = P (H = 1) = 1/2 and
a time horizon of T = 3. Assume k = 1 and 1 < K < 2.
The observation space of observer 1 is Y1 = {0, 1} and
the observations at time t obey the following conditional
probabilities:
Observation 0 1
P (·|H = 0) qt (1− qt)
P (·|H = 1) (1− qt) qt
where q1 = q2 = 1/2 and q3 = 1. Thus, the first
two observations of observer 1 reveal no information about
H while the third observation reveals H noiselessly. The
observation space of observer 2 is Y1 = {0, 1, 2} and
the observations at time t obey the following conditional
probabilities:
Observation 0 1 2
P (·|H = 0) rt (1− rt) 0
P (·|H = 1) 0 (1− rt) rt
where r2 = r3 = 0 and 0 < r1 < 1. Thus, the second and
third observations of observer 2 reveal no information about
H . Note that under this statistical model of observations,
there exists a choice of policies such that the system makes
perfect final decision on the hypothesis and incurs only
operational costs (if observer 2 stops at t = 1 and observer 1
Vt(pi, 0) = min{E[1{τ1=t}J(0, H) + 1{τ1>t}(k(τ1 − t) + J(U1τ1 , H))|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=0, U2t = 0],
E[1{τ1=t}J(1, H) + 1{τ1>t}(k(τ1 − t) + J(U1τ1 , H))|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=0, U2t = 1],
E[1{τ1=t}(k + Vt+1(Π2t+1, 1))
+ 1{τ1>t}(K + Vt+1(Π2t+1, 0))|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=0, U2t = b]} (3)
waits till time t = 3, then it can make a perfect decision on
H and the system incurs an operational cost of 2k = 2).
We assume that the cost of a mistake in the final decision
(ULτmax 6= H) is sufficiently high so that any choice of
policies that makes a mistake in the final decision with non-
zero probability will have a performance worse than 2. Thus,
any choice of policies that makes a mistake in the final
decision with non-zero probability cannot be optimal.
Under the above instance of our problem, if observer 2 is
restricted to use a two-threshold rule at time t = 1, then the
lowest achievable value of the objective is given as:
min[{r1 + (1− r1)(K + 1)}, {2− r1/2}] (5)
where the first term corresponds to the case when γ21 is given
as:
U21 =
 1 if Π
2
1 = 0
b if 0 < Π21 < 1
0 if Π21 = 1
(6)
and the second term corresponds to γ21 being
U21 =
{
1 if Π21 < 1
0 if Π21 = 1
(7)
Other choices of thresholds for observer 2 at time t = 1 do
not give a lower value than the expression in (5).
Consider now the following choice of γ2,∗1 :
U21 =
 1 if Π
2
1 = 0
0 if 0 < Π21 < 1
b if Π21 = 1
(8)
The lowest achievable expected cost under the above choice
of γ21 is J ∗ = 2(1− r1) + r1(K + 1)/2. It is easy to check
that for 1 < K < 2 and r1 < 2/3,
J ∗ < min[{r1 + (1− r1)(K + 1)}, {2− r1/2}]
Thus, γ2,∗1 outperforms the two-threshold rules.
Discussion: In the above example, observer 1 can always
make the correct decision at time t = 3. However, this
incurs additional operational costs. A good policy should
try to enable the observers to make the correct decision
before time t = 3, whenever possible. If observer 2 gets
the observations 0 or 2 at t = 1, then it is certain about the
true hypothesis. Using the first threshold rule given in (6),
observer 2 is able to convey to observer 1 that it is certain
about the true hypothesis and what this hypothesis is, thus
preventing observer 1 from waiting till time t = 3 to make
the final decision. However, in the case when observer 2 gets
measurement 1, it sends a blank and postpones its decision
to stop. This incurs additional operating costs for observer 2
without providing any new information that may prevent
observer 1 from delaying its decision to time t = 3. By
making r1 small, the contribution of this term in the overall
cost is increased. The second threshold (equation (7)) rule
attempts to keep the operational costs of observer 2 small
but does not always send enough information to observer 1
to enable it to make a decision before t = 3 even when
observer 1 knows the true value of H . The non-threshold
rule (given in (8)), however, keeps the operational cost of
observer 2 small (when r1 is small) while at the same time
ensuring that whenever observer 2 is certain about true value
of H , the final decision is not postponed to time t = 3.
V. PARAMETRIC CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL
POLICIES
An important advantage of the threshold rules in the case
of the centralized or the decentralized Wald problem is that it
modifies the problem of finding the globally optimal policies
from a sequential functional optimization problem to a
sequential parametric optimization problem. Even though we
have established that a classical threshold rule does not hold
for our problem, it is still possible to get a finite parametric
characterization of optimal policies. Such a parametric char-
acterization provides significant computational advantage in
finding optimal policies, for example by reducing the search
space for an optimal policy.
In Theorem 1, we have established that for an arbitrarily
fixed choice of observer 1’s policy, the optimal policy for
observer 2 can be determined by a dynamic program using
the value functions Vt(pi, a), t = T, ..., 2, 1. We have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2: With a fixed (but arbitrary) choice of Γ1, the
value function at T can be expressed as:
VT (pi, a) := min{l0(pi), l1(pi)} (9)
where l0 and l1 are affine functions of pi. Also, the value
functions at time t can be expressed as:
Vt(pi, 1) := min{l0(pi), l1(pi), Gt(pi)} (10)
where Gt is a concave function of pi, and
Vt(pi, 0) := min{L0t (pi), L1t (pi), Ht(pi)} (11)
where L0t and L
1
t are affine functions of pi and Ht is a
concave function of pi (the actual form of these functions
depends on the choice of Γ1).
Proof: See Appendix III.
Vt(pi, 0) = min{E[k(τ2 − t) + J(U2τ2 , H)|Π1t = pi,1{τ2<t}=0, U1t = 0],
E[k(τ2 − t) + J(U2τ2 , H)|Π1t = pi,1{τ2<t}=0, U1t = 1],
E[1{τ2=t}(k + Vt+1(Π1t+1, 1))
+ 1{τ2>t}(K + Vt+1(Π1t+1, 0))|Π1t = pi,1{τ2<t}=0, U1t = b]} (4)
Theorem 2: For any fixed policy Γ1 of observer 1, an
optimal policy for observer 2 can be characterized as follows:
U2T =
{
1 if Π2T ≤ αT
0 if Π2T > αT
where 0 ≤ αT ≤ 1. For t = 1, 2, .., T 1 − 1, if 1{τ1<t} = 1,
U2t =
 1 if Π
2
t ≤ αt(1)
b if αt(1) < Π2t ≤ βt(1)
0 if Π2t > βt(1)
where 0 ≤ αt(1) ≤ βt(1) ≤ 1, and if 1{τ1<t} = 0,
U2t =

b if Π2t < αt(0)
1 if αt(0) ≤ Π2t ≤ βt(0)
b if βt(0) < Π2t < δt(0)
0 if δt(0) ≤ Π2t ≤ θt(0)
b if Π2t > θt(0)
where 0 ≤ αt(0) ≤ βt(0) ≤ δt(0) ≤ θt(0) ≤ 1.
Proof: From lemma 2, we know that the value functions
can be written as minimum of affine and concave functions.
Since taking minimum of two straight lines and a concave
function can partition the interval [0, 1] into at most five
intervals, this gives a four threshold characterization of
optimal policy where the thresholds signify the boundaries of
these intervals. At time T or when 1{τ1<t} = 1, observer 2’s
decision of 0 or 1 is the final decision (ULτmax ) on H . In these
cases, if observer 2 is certain about H (that is its belief is 0
or 1), then it should clearly choose the correct value of H .
This fact reduces the number of thresholds for time T and
when 1{τ1<t} = 1.
Discussion: It is instructive to compare our problem with
the decentralized Wald problem studied in [6]. Both problems
involve two observers that make repeated observations of H
and decide when to stop. Unlike the problem in this paper,
in the decentralized Wald problem the sensors do not have
access to each other’s decisions, that is, an observer’s policy
is restricted to be of the form:
U it = γ
i
t(Y
i
1:t, U
i
1:t−1)
The optimality of classical two-threshold rules for the decen-
tralized Wald problem was established in [6]. In this paper,
we allowed each observer to observe other’s decisions and
showed that the two threshold rules are no longer optimal.
Both the decentralized Wald problem and the problem for-
mulated in this paper are team problems. That is, they involve
more than one decision maker with a common objective.
However, in the decentralized Wald problem, a decision-
maker’s decisions do not influence the information available
to other decision-makers. This is the essential criterion for
static team problems [9]. The problem formulated in this
paper is a dynamic team problem since a decision-maker’s
past decisions are a part of the information available to
other decision-makers. It is the dynamic aspect of this team
problem that allows for signaling between decision-makers
and changes the nature of optimal policies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We considered a sequential problem in decentralized de-
tection problem with signaling. Two observers make separate
costly measurements of a binary hypothesis and decide when
to stop. The observers can observe each other’s decisions
(whether the other observe has stopped or not and whether
the final decision was 0 or 1). The final decision of the
observer that stops in the end is taken as the final decision
made by the group. Thus, observers can convey information
to each other through their decisions. We identified informa-
tion states for the two observers and showed that classical
two threshold rules no longer guarantee optimality. However,
a finite parametric characterization of optimal policies is still
possible.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Part (i) follows from definition of τ1.
In Part (ii), if τ1 < t, then by definition, we have
Π2t := P (H = 0|Y 21:t, U11:t−1, U21:t−1 = b1:t−1)
= P (H = 0|Y 21:t, U11:τ1) (12)
where we removed redundant terms from the conditioning
(terms which are constants or functions of other terms).
Similarly,
Π2t+1 = P (H = 0|Y 21:t+1, U11:τ1),
which, on using Bayes’ rule gives,
Π2t+1 =
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)Π2t
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)Π2t + P (Y 2t+1|H = 1)(1−Π2t )
=: ft+1(Π
2
t+1, Y
2
t+1) (13)
If τ1 ≥ t, then U11:t−1 = b1:t−1 (that is all decisions of
observer 1 are blanks till time t− 1) and
Π2t := P (H = 0|Y 21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t−1 = b1:t−1)
Also,
Π2t+1 := P (H = 0|Y 21:t+1, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U1t , U21:t = b1:t)
=
P (Y 2t+1, U
1
t , H = 0|Y 21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t)∑
h∈{0,1}
P (Y 2t+1, U
1
t , h|Y 21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t)
(14)
The numerator in (14) can be written as:
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)·
{P (U1t |H = 0, Y 21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t)}Π2t (15)
We now focus on the second term in (15).
Claim: Consider a realization u1t , y
2
1:t. Then,
P (u1t |H = 0, y21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t)
= P (u1t |H = 0, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t) (16)
Moreover, under the given choice of Γ1, the probability on
the right hand side of (16) is a function only of u1t .
Proof of claim: Using Bayes’ rule,
P (u1t |H = 0, y21:t, U11:t−1 = b1:t−1, U21:t = b1:t)
=
P (u1t , H = 0, y
2
1:t, U
1
1:t−1 = b1:t−1, U
2
1:t = b1:t)∑
u′
P (U1t = u
′, H = 0, y21:t, U
1
1:t−1 = b1:t−1, U
2
1:t = b1:t)
(17)
Consider the joint probability in the numerator in (17)
P (u1t , H = 0, y
2
1:t, b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t)
where we use b11:t−1, b
2
1:t−1 as shorthand notations for
U11:t−1 = b1:t−1 and U
2
1:t−1 = b1:t−1 respectively. This
probability can be further written as:
=
∑
y11:t
P (u1t , H = 0, y
2
1:t, b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t, y
1
1:t)
=
∑
y11:t
[P (u1t |y11:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1)
· P (U2t = b|y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1)
· P (y1t |H = 0)P (y2t |H = 0)
·
t−1∏
k=1
{P (U1k = b|y11:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)
· P (U2k = b|y21:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)
· P (y1k|H = 0)P (y2k|H = 0)}] · p0 (18)
Rearranging the summation in (18), we get
P (U2t = b|y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1)P (y2t |H = 0) · p0
·
t−1∏
k=1
{P (U2k = b|y21:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)P (y2k|H = 0)}
·
∑
y11:t
[P (u1t |y11:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1)P (y1t |H = 0)
·
t−1∏
k=1
{P (U1k = b|y11:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)P (y1k|H = 0)}] (19)
Expressions similar to (19) hold for each term in the denom-
inator of (17) and the terms outside the summation over y11:t
cancel out in the numerator and the denominator. We note
that the summation over y11:t in (19) does not depend on y
2
1:t.
Hence, the conditional probability in the left hand side of
(17) does not depend on y21:t. This establishes equation (16).
We also note that under the fixed policy Γ1 of observer 1, the
summation over y11:t in (19) is a function only of u
1
t . Thus,
the probability on the right hand side of (16) is a function
only of u1t . This concludes the proof of the claim.
Using the result of the claim in (15) and using similar
arguments for the denominator in (14), we get
Π2t+1
=
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)P (U1t |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t)Π2t
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)P (U1t |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t)Π2t
+P (Y 2t+1|H = 1)P (U1t |H = 1, b11:t−1, b21:t)(1−Π2t )
=: gt+1(Π
2
t+1, Y
2
t+1, U
1
t ) (20)
APPENDIX II
PROOF OUTLINE OF THEOREM 1
We provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 1. The
general idea is to show that at each time t, the value functions
of Definition 2 represent the optimal future costs. Therefore,
a policy that for each realization of Π2t ,1{τ1<t} selects
the minimizing term in the corresponding value function
achieves the optimal cost. Thus, an optimal policy can be
found that depends only on Π2t ,1{τ1<t}. We start from time
T .
If the observer 2 is active at the terminal time T , it can
only make one of two decisions: 0 or 1. The expected future
cost of choosing u ∈ {0, 1} for observer 2 is
E[J(u,H)|Y 21:T , U11:T−1, U21:T−1 = b1:T−1]
= J(u, 0)Π2T + J(u, 1)(1−Π2T )
= E[J(u,H)|Π2T ] (21)
Thus, the value function at time T is the minimum of the
expected future costs incurred by choosing 0 or 1. Hence,
it represents the optimal expected future cost for observer 2
at time T . Proceeding backwards, we assume that the value
functions at time t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T represent optimal future
costs at the respective times and consider two cases at each
time t < T .
Case A: τ1 < t If observer 1 has already stopped before
t, then observer 2’s stopping problem is the same as the
centralized Wald problem and the value function Vt(pi, 1) is
same as the value function in the dynamic program for the
Wald problem.
Case B: τ1 ≥ t We now consider the case when observer 1
has not stopped before time t. If observer 2 decides to stop
and chooses u ∈ {0, 1} at time t, then the expected future
cost will be
E
[
1{τ1=t}J(u,H)
+ 1{τ1>t}(k(τ1 − t) + J(U1τ1 , H))
∣∣∣∣ Y 21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u
]
(22)
Claim: The expectation in (22) is same as:
E[1{τ1=t}J(u,H)+
1{τ1>t}(k(τ1 − t) + J(U1τ1 , H))|Π2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u]
(23)
Proof of claim: For each realization y21:t of observer 2’s
observations, the expectation in (22) depends on the con-
ditional distribution of the following random variables:
H, τ1, U1τ1 given the realization of the random variables
y21:t, b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t−1, U
2
t = u. Note that under the fixed policy
Γ1 of observer 1, τ1, U1τ1 are functions of observer 1’s
observation sequence Y 11:T and the terms b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t−1, U
2
t =
u fixed in the conditioning. Hence the conditional belief
P (H, τ1, U1τ1 |y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)
is a deterministic transformation of the belief
P (H,Y 11:T |y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u).
We will show that the above probability is same as
P (H,Y 11:T |pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)
and hence the conditional expectation in (22) is same as
E[1{τ1=t}J(u,H)+
1{τ1>t}(k(τ1 − t) + J(U1τ1 , H))|pi2t ,1{τ1<t}=0, U2t = u]
which corresponds to the first two terms in the minimization
in Vt(pi2t , 0) in equation (3).
Consider P (H = 0, y11:T |y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)
= P (y11:T |H = 0, y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)pi2t (24)
Similarly,
P (H = 0, y11:T |pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)
= P (y11:T |H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)pi2t (25)
We now compare the first terms in (24) and (25). Consider
the first term in (24), which can be written as
=
P (H = 0, y11:T , y
2
1:t, b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t−1, U
2
t = u)∑
y˜11:T
P (H = 0, y˜11:T , y
2
1:t, b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t−1, U
2
t = u)
(26)
The numerator can be written as:
P (y1t+1:T |H = 0)P (U2t = u|y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1)
· P (y1t |H = 0)P (y2t |H = 0)
·
t−1∏
k=1
{P (U1k = b|y11:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)
· P (U2k = b|y21:k, b11:k−1, b21:k−1)
· P (y1k|H = h)P (y2k|H = h)} · p0 (27)
Similar expressions hold for the denominator in (26) and the
terms that depend on y21:t will cancel in the numerator and
the denominator. Therefore,
P (y11:T |H = 0, y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)
= P (y11:T |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u) (28)
Now consider the first term in (25) which can be written as:
P (y11:T |H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)
=
∑
y21:t
[P (y11:T |y21:t, H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)
· P (y21:t|H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)]
=
∑
y21:t
[P (y11:T |y21:t, H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)
· P (y21:t|H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)] (29)
The first term inside the summation in (29) is same as LHS
of (28). Using (28) in (29) gives∑
y21:t
[P (y11:T |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u)
· P (y21:t|H = 0, pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = u)]
= P (y11:T |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = u) (30)
which is same as RHS of (28). Thus the probabilities in
RHS of (24) and (25) are equal. Similar conclusions hold
for H = 1 in (24) and (25) . This implies the equality of
expectations and completes the proof of the claim.
As a consequence of the claim, the first two terms in
the minimization in the definition of Vt(pi, 0) (equation 3)
correspond to the expected future cost of choosing 0 or 1 at
time t. On the other hand, if observer 2 decides to continue at
time t, then by the fact that value functions at t+1 represent
the expected future costs at t+ 1, we can write the expected
future cost as:
E
[
1{τ1=t}(k + Vt+1(Πt+1, 1))
+ 1{τ1>t}(K + Vt+1(Πt+1, 0))
∣∣∣∣ Y 21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = b
]
(31)
Using lemma 1 and the fact that under fixed policy Γ1
of observer 1, U1t is a function of observer 1’s observation
sequence Y 11:t and the terms b
1
1:t−1, b
2
1:t−1 fixed in the condi-
tioning , one can conclude that for each realization of y21:t this
expectation in (31) is a function of the following conditional
probability:
P (Y 11:t, Y
2
t+1|y21:t, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = b)
Using arguments similar to those in the claim above, it can
be shown that the above conditional probability is same as:
P (Y 11:t, Y
2
t+1|pi2t ,1{τ1<t} = 0, U2t = b)
This shows that the third term in the minimization in the
definition of Vt(pi, 0) (equation 3) is the expected future cost
of making a decision to continue at time t. Thus, Vt(Π2t , 0)
is the minimum of the future costs incurred by choosing 0, 1
or b. Hence, it represents the optimal future cost at time t,
if observer 1 has not already stopped before time t.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OUTLINE OF LEMMA 2
We define the following functions
l0(pi) : = J(0, 0)pi + J(0, 1)(1− pi)
= E[J(0, H)|Π2t = pi]
l1(pi) : = J(1, 0)pi + J(1, 1)(1− pi)
= E[J(1, H)|Π2t = pi]
For the value function at time T , the result of the lemma
follows from the definitions of l0(pi), l1(pi) and VT (pi, a).
Since, for each a ∈ {0, 1}, VT (pi, a) is the minimum of two
affine functions of pi, it implies that, for each a ∈ {0, 1},
VT (pi, a) is a concave function of pi. Now, assume that
Vt+1(pi, a) is concave in pi for each a ∈ {0, 1}. The concavity
of the value functions at time t+ 1 implies that they can be
written as infimum of affine functions of pi. In particular, we
have
Vt+1(pi, 1) = inf
i
{aipi + bi} (32)
and
Vt+1(pi, 0) = inf
i
{cipi + di} (33)
Now consider Vt(pi, 1). The first two terms in the definition
of Vt(pi, 1) are affine in pi (see Definition 2). We need to
show that the third term -
k + E[Vt+1(Π
2
t+1, 1)|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=1] (34)
-is a concave function of pi. From equation (13) in the proof
of lemma 1, we know that Πt+1 can be written as:
Π2t+1 =
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)Π2t
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)Π2t + P (Y 2t+1|H = 1)(1−Π2t )
=
P (Y 2t+1|H = 0)Π2t
P (Y 2t+1|Π2t )
(35)
Substituting (35) in (34) and evaluating the expectation gives:
k +
∑
y∈Y
P (Y 2t+1 = y|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t} = 1)
Vt+1
(
P (Y 2t+1 = y|H = 0)pi
P (Y 2t+1 = y|pi)
, 1
)
(36)
Now using the characterization of Vt+1(pi, 1) from (32), we
get
k +
∑
y∈Y
P (Y 2t+1 = y|Π2t = pi)[
inf
i
{ai
(
P (Y 2t+1 = y|H = 0)pi
P (Y 2t+1 = y|pi)
)
+ bi}
]
= k +
∑
y∈Y
inf
i
{ai(P (Y 2t+1 = y|H = 0)pi)
+ biP (Y
2
t+1 = y|H = 0)pi
+ biP (Y
2
t+1 = y|H = 1)(1− pi)} (37)
Each term in the summation over y ∈ Y is infimum of
affine functions of pi, hence each term in the summation is
a concave function of pi. Thus, the third term of Vt(pi, 1) is
a concave function of pi.
Next consider Vt(pi, 0) defined in (3). The conditional
expectation for the first (or second) term in the minimization
in RHS of (3) is an affine function of the conditional proba-
bility of the random variables H,Y 11:T . Using arguments from
Appendix II, this conditional probability can be written as:
P (y11:T , H = 0|pi2t , b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = 0)
= P (y11:T |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = 0)pi2t (38)
and
P (y11:T , H = 1|pi2t , b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = 0)
= P (y11:T |H = 1, b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = 0)(1− pi2t ) (39)
Thus, the conditional probability
P (Y 11:T , H|pi2t , b11:t−1, b21:t−1, U2t = 0) is an affine function
of pi2t . This establishes the affine nature of the first two
terms of RHS of (3) . The third term in Vt(pi, 0) can be
written as:
E
[
1{U1t 6=b}(k + Vt+1(gt+1(pi, Y
2
t+1, U
1
t ), 1))
+ 1{U1t =b}(K + Vt+1(gt+1(pi, Y
2
t+1, b), 0))
∣∣∣ Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=0,
U2t = b
]
(40)
Consider the first term in the summation in (40). Evaluating
the expectation, we get∑
u1t ,y
2
t+1
[1{u1t 6=b}(k + Vt+1(gt+1(pi, y
2
t+1, u
1
t ), 1))
· P (u1t , y2t+1|Π2t = pi,1{τ1<t}=0, U2t = b)] (41)
Using the characterization of gt+1 from (14) and (20), the
characterization of Vt+1(pi, 1) from (33) and arguments from
Appendix II, (41) can be shown to be equal to∑
u1t=0,1
∑
y2t+1
[k
+ inf
i
{aiP (y2t+1|H = 0)P (u1t |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t)pi
+ biP (y
2
t+1|H = 0)P (u1t |H = 0, b11:t−1, b21:t)pi
+ biP (y
2
t+1|H = 1)P (u1t |H = 1, b11:t−1, b21:t)(1− pi)}]
(42)
which is concave in pi (since it is infimum of affine functions
in pi). Similar arguments can be made for the second term
in (40) to conclude the concavity of third term in Vt(pi, 0).
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